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QKD . . . offers the ultimate security of the inviolability of a law of Nature for key distri-
bution. —Hughes, Alde, Dyer, Luther, Morgan, and Schauer, 1995 [15]
Quantum cryptography differs from conventional cryptography in that the data are kept
secret by the properties of quantum mechanics, rather than the conjectured difficulty of
computing certain functions. —Shor and Preskill, 2000 [25]
Quantum key distribution provides perfect security because, unlike its classical counterpart,
it relies on the laws of physics. —Christandl, Renner, and Ekert, 2004 [9]
However, in contrast to these public key schemes, QKD as a cryptographic primitive offers
security that is guaranteed by the laws of physics. —Campagna, Chen, Dagdelen, Ding,
Fernick, Gisin, Hayford, Jennewein, Lütkenhaus, Mosca, Neill, Pecen,
Perlner, Ribordy, Schanck, Stebila, Walenta, Whyte, and Zhang, 2015 [7]
Quantum cryptography solves the problem of key distribution by allowing the exchange of
a cryptographic key between two remote parties with absolute security, guaranteed by the
fundamental laws of physics. —ID Quantique, 2016 [16]
It is often claimed that the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) is
guaranteed by the laws of physics. However, this claim is content-free if the
underlying theoretical definition of QKD is not actually compatible with the
laws of physics. This paper observes that (1) the laws of physics pose serious
obstacles to the security of QKD and (2) the same laws are ignored in all QKD
“security proofs”.
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1 The “provable security” of quantum cryptography
The core advertisement for quantum cryptography—in particular, for quantum key dis-
tribution, which I’ll focus on—is the claim that its security is guaranteed by the laws of
physics. One would expect this claim to be backed by a clearly stated theorem having the
following shape:
• “Assume L.” Here L is a statement of the laws of physics.
• “Assume P .” Here P states physical actions carried out by Alice and Bob.
• “Then S.” Here S states a security property: e.g., something about the randomness,
from Eve’s perspective, of a key shared between Alice and Bob.
This theorem statement would provide a starting point for security auditors to dive into
questions of whether the stated L is actually how the real world works; whether the stated
P matches what is actually being sold as “quantum key distribution”; whether the proof of
the theorem is correct; and whether the stated S actually includes what the users want.
An auditor who attempts to find this security theorem in the literature will easily
find papers claiming to present “security proofs” for several different types of quantum
cryptography; see, e.g., [10]. However, the theorems in these papers never seem to explicitly
hypothesize L, the laws of physics.
Is this merely a culture gap—when physicists say “Theorem” they implicitly mean
a theorem under certain well-known hypotheses? Or is there an important reason that
these papers aren’t hypothesizing Newton’s law of gravitation, for example, and Maxwell’s
equations for electromagnetism? Or refinements such as general relativity and quantum
electrodynamics?
An auditor who dives more deeply into the “security proofs” won’t find Maxwell’s
equations used anywhere. This justifies omitting Maxwell’s equations as a hypothesis, but
it also strongly suggests that the secret physical actions taken by Alice and Bob don’t
involve any electricity or magnetism. How could one possibly prove anything about the
effects of electromagnetic actions without invoking the relevant laws of physics? Similarly,
Newton’s law isn’t used anywhere, strongly suggesting that the secret physical actions
taken by Alice and Bob don’t involve moving any mass around. But then what exactly are
the secret actions taken by Alice and Bob?
2 Abstractions without examples
A closer look shows that the papers don’t actually say what physical actions Alice and Bob
are hypothesized to be carrying out. Sometimes the papers do specify physical details of,
e.g., polarized photons being sent from Alice to Bob via Eve in “BB84 QKD”; or entangled
pairs of photons being sent from Eve to both Alice and Bob in “device-independent E91
QKD” (see, e.g., [20]); or photons being sent with particular timing in “relativistic QKD”
(see, e.g., [18]); but there are always many other steps taken by Alice and Bob whose
physical details are not mentioned anywhere in any of the “security proofs”.
Instead the papers make various abstract hypotheses regarding quantum states. Con-
sider, for example, the following hypothesis from [17]:
Eve can choose an observable Z and obtains an outcome E. We assume that
this, together with the public messages exchanged by Alice and Bob, is all
information available to her.
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Apparently Alice and Bob are supposed to take physical actions that do not interact with
Eve’s quantum state except through the public interactions specified by the protocol. This
begs the question of what those physical actions are supposed to be.
Obviously there are physical actions that Alice and Bob can take in the real world that
might look like QKD but that don’t actually meet the hypotheses of the QKD “security
proofs”. In particular, every QKD “security proof” assumes that there are various secret
actions by Alice and Bob, actions unobserved by Eve, such as a sizeable fraction of Alice’s
choices of polarization bases in the BB84 protocol. If Alice and Bob actually leak these
secrets to Eve then these hypotheses are false and the QKD “security proofs” say nothing.
Anyone who claims that the security of QKD is guaranteed by the laws of physics is
logically forced to argue that these physical actions by Alice and Bob are not actually QKD:
the only physical actions that qualify as QKD are those for which the hypotheses of the
theorems are satisfied. On the other hand, many authors insist on using the label “QKD”
for actions that are obviously outside the scope of the theorems. Sometimes “security”
systems that have already been convincingly demonstrated to fail in the real world (see,
e.g., [14]) are still sold as “QKD”.
To avoid confusion, let’s use the name “theoretical QKD” to refer to QKD meeting all
of the hypotheses of the theorems. Is it clear that theoretical QKD exists within the laws
of physics? Are there any examples of physical actions for Alice and Bob that do qualify
as theoretical QKD?
Consider the following nightmare scenario for the QKD “security proofs”: The hy-
potheses of theoretical QKD are actually inconsistent with the laws of physics. For every
sequence of physical actions that Alice and Bob can take, the hypotheses turn out to be
false. It is vacuous to claim that the security of theoretical QKD is guaranteed by the
laws of physics, since the laws of physics imply that theoretical QKD does not exist. What
evidence do we have that the QKD “security proofs” are not in this nightmare scenario?
Part of the job of a mathematician or computer scientist stating a theorem is to verify—
or at least plausibly conjecture—that there are examples meeting the hypotheses of the
theorem. Vacuous lemmas are occasionally stated as intermediate steps inside proofs by
contradiction, but these lemmas are also clearly identified as being vacuous, not as saying
anything meaningful.
3 The holographic principle
Let me focus specifically on the hypothesis that Alice and Bob are taking various actions
unobserved by Eve. This is, as I mentioned above, assumed in every QKD “security proof”.
Obviously Alice and Bob have no security against Eve if Eve observes all of their secrets,
so one cannot avoid making such a hypothesis.
This hypothesis seems to be flatly contradicted by the “holographic principle”. In the
words of Brian Greene [11, page 272]:
The holographic principle envisions that all we experience may be fully and
equivalently described as the comings and goings that take place at a thin and
remote locus. It says that if we could understand the laws that govern physics
on that distant surface, and the way phenomena there link to experience here,
we would grasp all there is to know about reality.
Readers not familiar with the idea that the universe is connected in this way should
consider radios as an example of long-distance interaction. Radio communication typi-
cally relies on Alice and Bob generating a reasonably strong signal to make the receiver’s
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job easier, but this cooperation is not necessary; by building a very large array of radio
receivers, Eve can pick up a very faint radio signal from ten thousand miles away.
In light of Maxwell’s equations, how can one justify the notion that Eve is unable
to observe secret electromagnetic actions by Alice and Bob? Alice and Bob can try to
use a Faraday cage to block their signal, but a Faraday cage does not create a truly
isolated environment (see, e.g., [3] and [12]); it merely applies some scrambling to the
signals emitted from that environment. One could hypothesize that Eve is not observing
the actions by Alice and Bob—perhaps Eve is underfunded, or simply lazy—but this is
obviously not “absolute security, guaranteed by the fundamental laws of physics”.
It seems that the only way for Alice and Bob to avoid Maxwell’s information leak is
to avoid any data flow from secrets to electricity or magnetism. But then how are Alice
and Bob supposed to control their photon generators, photon detectors, and other QKD
equipment?
More importantly, the holographic principle says that the difficulty here is not limited
to electromagnetism. Any physical encoding of information will be visible to a sufficiently
resourceful attacker watching signals on a remote screen.
Well-known examples of signal processing (sonar arrays, radar arrays, X-ray tomogra-
phy, magnetic-resonance imaging, etc.) all seem to fit the following general rule: Eve’s cost
for stealing a physically encoded secret grows only polynomially with Eve’s distance from
the secret. Alice and Bob might try to hide at some reasonable distance from attackers,
and from any attacker-controlled equipment, but this only moderately increases the cost
of the attack.
QKD is claimed to have information-theoretic security guaranteed by the laws of
physics, not depending on “the conjectured difficulty of computing certain functions”. Even
if holographic signal processing actually has superpolynomial cost, the availability of the
holographic signal is enough to contradict the QKD security claims. Eve can carry out
all necessary computations at her leisure, retroactively breaking QKD without having to
interfere with the protocol execution. This directly contradicts the claims in [27] and [24,
page 17] that QKD offers “everlasting security”, and the similar claim in [7, page 19].
Of course, claimed “laws” of physics do not have the same level of certainty as math-
ematics. Many past “laws” seem inconsistent with experiment and are no longer believed
to be accurate: e.g., Newton’s law of gravitation is merely a first approximation, failing to
take relativistic effects into account. One might speculate that (1) the holographic prin-
ciple is not true in the level of generality suggested in [13], [26], [5], etc.; (2) the leaks
of information to Eve are “merely” through electromagnetic waves, gravity, etc.; and (3)
there is some way for Alice and Bob to carry out QKD without triggering any of these
leaks of information. In other words, it is conceivable that some law of physics not known
today will eventually guarantee the security of some form of QKD not specified today. But
these unsupported speculations are very far from justifying the claim that QKD provides
“absolute security, guaranteed by the fundamental laws of physics”.
4 A concrete attack against QKD
Here is an attack to illustrate the principles of Section 3. An attacker turns on a large
array of radio receivers, leaves it on, and records the resulting data. A tiny budget, on the
scale of a million dollars per year, will allow the attacker to store a gigabyte of data1 per
second.
1This metric presumes that the radio signals are converted from analog to digital before being stored.
Perhaps the attack is even more effective if the attacker records the signals directly in some analog form.
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The victim then begins using a state-of-the-art QKD device. This device relies on
the secrecy of non-quantum information encoded inside the equipment as conventional
electromagnetic signals (not to be confused with the unclonable quantum information sent
via photons). These conventional electromagnetic signals influence the data recorded by
the attacker, as per Maxwell’s equations. This influence also depends on other inputs, such
as the physical location and shape of objects that have been reflecting radio waves, so the
attacker also collects as much information as possible about these inputs by recording data
from a similarly large array of cameras, microphones, and other sensors.
The attacker now computes the most likely possibilities for the victim’s QKD secrets,
and thus for the resulting secret keys, given the recorded data. This is a mathematical
computation exploiting the laws of physics—the equations that determine the influence of
the QKD secrets and other inputs upon the data recorded by the attacker.
From an information-theoretic perspective, it seems likely that the recorded data is
sufficient to successfully pinpoint the secret keys of all QKD users. There is certainly no
guarantee to the contrary. There is an algorithmic challenge of optimizing the computation
of these secrets, and perhaps the best algorithm that we can figure out will take a million
years to run on future computer equipment, but there is again no guarantee of this.
Now compare this attack to the claim made by Campagna, Chen, Dagdelen, Ding,
Fernick, Gisin, Hayford, Jennewein, Lütkenhaus, Mosca, Neill, Pecen, Perlner, Ribordy,
Schanck, Stebila, Walenta, Whyte, and Zhang in [7, page 19]:
An important characteristic of quantum key distribution is that any attack
(e.g. any attempt to exploit a flaw in an implementation of transmitters or
receivers) must be carried out in real time. Contrary to classical cryptographic
schemes, in QKD there is no way to save the information for later decryption by
more powerful technologies. This greatly reduces the window of opportunity for
performing an attack against QKD; the window is much wider for conventional
cryptography.
This claim is disproven by the QKD attack explained above:
• The attack does not need to be completed in “real time”.
• The attack does save information for later decryption.
• The attack does take advantage of more powerful technologies available in the future.
The only accurate part of the claim is that the attack must begin before the victim uses
QKD—the attacker must plan ahead by collecting and storing data for later analysis—but
the comparison in [7] already assumes that the attacker is collecting and storing data for
later analysis.2 In the real world, ever-increasing amounts of data are being stored from a
wide range of collection devices; in other words, the attack has already begun.
Someone who claims that the security of QKD is “guaranteed by the laws of physics” is
logically forced to claim that the laws of physics guarantee that this particular attack does
not work. When I ask such people why they think that this attack will fail, they typically
answer in one of the following ways:
• Speculation: Claim that the electromagnetic signal is too weak for the attacker to
pick up at distance x.
2As a side note on costs, it is not obvious in advance exactly how much data needs to be recorded for
this QKD attack to succeed. This uncertainty means that a sensible attacker will opt for an “overkill”
approach of recording as much data as he can afford to collect; subsequent analysis will show whether this
was enough, and the attacker will then use this experience to optimize subsequent attacks. For comparison,
an attacker who records the conventional encoding of all data sent through an Internet router is confidently
recording all data that normal users of the router will act upon.
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This might be true in some cases, depending on x and on many more details of
what the attacker is doing, but all of this needs analysis—see Section 6. More to
the point, even in situations where this claim is true, this is not the same as security
“guaranteed by the laws of physics”.
• Abstraction: Describe today’s electromagnetic devices as mere “implementations” of
an abstract concept of theoretical QKD; claim that any exploitable “imperfections”
in these “implementations” will be corrected by future “implementations”.
This claim begs the question of what exactly those “implementations” will be: how
can theoretical QKD be embedded into the physical world, in light of the holographic
principle? More to the point, this claim implicitly admits that the QKD security
“guarantee” is not actually from the laws of physics, but rather from a simplified—I
say oversimplified—model.
• Marketing: Outline particular examples of next-generation “device-independent” E91
QKD devices; say that it is important to fund development of these devices; and claim
that these QKD devices will have security guaranteed by the laws of physics where
previous BB84 QKD devices did not.
At this point the claims are not even marginally consistent with the literature, which
claims security guarantees for both BB84 and E91.
• Distraction:3 Complain that other forms of cryptography are also potentially vul-
nerable to this type of attack.
This complaint is both correct and irrelevant. What I am disputing is the frequent
unjustified claim Q that quantum cryptography has security guaranteed by the laws
of physics. Perhaps somewhere there is some other unjustified claim C that some
other form of cryptography has security guaranteed by the laws of physics, but it is
illogical to use a complaint about C as a justification for Q.
I do not have experimental evidence that this particular QKD attack works, but I also see
no justification for the claim that the attack will fail.
5 Previous work
There is a huge literature claiming that the security of theoretical QKD is guaranteed by
the laws of physics. I am not aware of previous papers clearly and directly raising the
possibility that this claim is vacuous—that theoretical QKD is not actually compatible
with the laws of physics.
Plaga in [21] pointed out that speculations about nonlinearity of quantum gravity, if
correct, could allow Eve to extract information from the data explicitly communicated in
some QKD protocols. What I am saying is quite different: I am focusing on information
leaked from the “secret” portions of QKD protocols, and I am relying on core physical
phenomena such as electromagnetism.
More relevant is a paper [22] by Rudolph, which (among other things) questions the
“impenetrability/no emanation” hypotheses for theoretical QKD. What I am saying is
stronger in three ways:
• Rudolph merely questions the hypotheses, while I am questioning both the hypothe-
ses and the conclusion.
3Hey, look, a squirrel!
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• Regarding details, Rudolph touches upon ways that some secrets could leak, and
asks whether these leaks can be limited to “an exponentially small amount of use-
ful information”, while I am pointing to ways that all secrets leak to a sufficiently
resourceful attacker.
• Rudolph says that a “black hole lab” would “presumably” satisfy the hypotheses,
while I am not drawing any such line. My impression of the consensus of physicists is
that black holes are not an exception to the holographic principle. This is important
because the extreme case of a “black hole lab” provides some intuition for the best
that one can hope for by adding more and more shielding.
Rudolph is saying that secrets are not exactly unobservable, while I am giving reasons
to believe that secrets are not even approximately unobservable, and that the answer to
Rudolph’s “exponentially small” question is negative. This is important for claims that
QKD is improving, eliminating “imperfections”, etc.
Brassard stated in [6] that the original prototype implementation of QKD “was un-
conditionally secure against any eavesdropper who happened to be deaf ! :-)” (italics and
smiley in original). This is still an overstatement of the security provided by the imple-
mentation. It is clear that the implementation would also have given up all of its secrets
to, e.g., a deaf eavesdropper watching the screen of an oscilloscope attached to a small coil
of wire. More importantly, Brassard presented this security failure as being specific to one
implementation of QKD, not recognizing the possibility of the laws of physics forcing the
same fundamental type of security failure to appear in all forms of QKD.
A series of papers on “quantum hacking”, such as [14] by Huang, Sajeed, Chaiwongkhot,
Soucarros, Legre, and Makarov, have broken the security of various commercial imple-
mentations of QKD. All of these attacks follow the theme of Eve interacting physically
(passively or actively) with the “secret” computations by Alice and Bob.
Various earlier attacks are surveyed by Scarani and Kurtsiefer in [23], who generally
express skepticism regarding the security of QKD but also claim that “in principle QKD
can be made secure”. A careful reading shows that this claim again starts from—and
does not attempt to justify—the questionable hypothesis that Alice and Bob are taking
various actions unobserved by Eve. This hypothesis is obviously false in various examples
of successful QKD attacks summarized in [23]; but Scarani and Kurtsiefer, like Brassard,
do not recognize the possibility of the holographic principle allowing Eve to violate the
hypothesis for all possible QKD devices.
None of the previous literature has stopped researchers from claiming that the security
of QKD is guaranteed by the laws of physics—and dismissing every QKD security failure,
every leak of secrets, as a supposedly fixable implementation mistake.
6 Countermeasures
What should Alice and Bob do if the promise of “security guaranteed by the fundamen-
tal laws of physics” is a sham—in particular, if physical effects allow a computationally
unlimited attacker to steal secrets from an arbitrary distance?
The obvious answer is to study the cost of Eve’s attack, and to take measures to increase
this cost—hopefully beyond anything that Eve can afford. There are several ways to argue
that Eve is subject to cost limits, such as the following:
• Perhaps the lifetime of the universe is limited.
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• Perhaps, even in an everlasting universe, the cosmological constant is positive, putting
a limit on all computations, as explained in [4]. This constant is generally believed
to be around 10−122.
• Perhaps the space aliens who control most of the resources in the universe are happy
that Alice and Bob are secretly arranging climate-change protests, and are not willing
to help policewoman Eve see these secrets. Compare [19].
If Eve is limited to cost C, then Alice and Bob do not need to aim for the unachievable
goal of security guaranteed by the laws of physics; Alice and Bob merely need to be secure
against all attacks that cost at most C.
Earlier I mentioned that Eve’s cost for stealing a physically encoded secret seems to
grow only polynomially with Eve’s distance from the secret. However, this polynomial
also seems to depend heavily on the choice of encoding mechanism. Alice and Bob can
and should choose technologies for encoding their secrets with the goal of making this
polynomial as large as possible. For example, one might guess that the following steps
help:
• Store and process secrets inside a modern 10nm Intel CPU, rather than using older,
less efficient chip technology. Presumably consuming less energy for the same com-
putation will reduce the amount of signal visible to Eve, increasing Eve’s cost for
recovering the secrets.
• Hide the secrets by adding shields and by generating extra noise. A Faraday cage
leaks information, as mentioned above, but seems to make the information more
difficult to intercept and decipher.
• Mask the secrets, for example by encoding bit 0 as a random even-weight 4-bit string
and encoding bit 1 as a random odd-weight 4-bit string.
• Apply more sophisticated mathematical encodings, such as “secret-key cryptography”
and “public-key cryptography”.
Of course, guessing is not the same as systematically studying the actual impact on attack
cost. The premier venue for scientific papers analyzing the costs of attackers learning
secrets from (passive and active) physical effects, and analyzing the costs of users defending
themselves against these attacks, is the “Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems”
(CHES) conference series. CHES has run every year since 1999 and has attracted more
than 300 attendees every year since 2009.
I can easily be accused of bias—I’ve served on the CHES program committee every year
since 2008 (looking mainly at the costs for users)—but I don’t think anyone can dispute
the need for this type of research. Competent attackers take advantage of not merely the
information that we declare as public but also all of the information they can see through
every available side channel. We have to take the same perspective, taking account of all
aspects of how secrets are embedded into the real world, if we want to build information-
protection systems that society can afford to use but that the attackers find infeasible to
break.
The QKD literature doesn’t try to argue that QKD will produce improvements within
the traditional chart of (x, y) = (user cost, attack cost). Instead the QKD literature tries
to dodge cost questions by claiming that QKD inhabits a magical realm beyond the top of
the chart—security “guaranteed by the laws of physics”. Unfortunately, this claim is not
justified anywhere in the literature, and it seems very difficult to justify, in light of what
the laws of physics actually say.
8
References
[1] — (no editor), Proceedings of IEEE information theory workshop on theory and
practice in information theoretic security, Awaji Island, Japan, October 2005, 2006.
See [6].
[2] Ahmed Ali, John Ellis, Seifallah Randjbar-Daemi (editors), Salamfestschrift: a col-
lection of talks from the Conference on Highlights of Particle and Condensed Matter
Physics, ICTP, Trieste, Italy, 8–12 March 1993, World Scientific Series in 20th
Century Physics, 4, World Scientific, 1993. See [13].
[3] Daniel J. Bernstein, The inverse Faraday challenge (talk slides) (2016). URL:
https://cr.yp.to/talks.html#2016.08.18. Citations in this document: §3.
[4] Raphael Bousso, Positive vacuum energy and the N -bound, Journal of High Energy
Physics 11 (2000), 038. URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/0010252. DOI:
10.1088/1126-6708/2000/11/038. Citations in this document: §6.
[5] Raphael Bousso, The holographic principle, Reviews of Modern Physics 74 (2002),
825–874. URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/0203101. DOI: 10.1103/RevMod-
Phys.74.825. Citations in this document: §3.
[6] Gilles Brassard, Brief history of quantum cryptography: a personal perspective,
in [1] (2006), 19–23. URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0604072. DOI:
10.1109/ITWTPI.2005.1543949. Citations in this document: §5.
[7] Matthew Campagna, Lidong Chen, Özgür Dagdelen, Jintai Ding, Jennifer K. Fer-
nick, Nicolas Gisin, Donald Hayford, Thomas Jennewein, Norbert Lütkenhaus,
Michele Mosca, Brian Neill, Mark Pecen, Ray Perlner, Grégoire Ribordy, John M.
Schanck, Douglas Stebila, Nino Walenta, William Whyte, Zhenfei Zhang, Quantum
safe cryptography and security: an introduction, benefits, enablers and challenges,
ETSI White Paper No. 8 (2015). URL: http://www.etsi.org/images/files/
ETSIWhitePapers/QuantumSafeWhitepaper.pdf. Citations in this document: §1,
§3, §4, §4.
[8] Ran Canetti, Juan A. Garay (editors), Advances in cryptology—CRYPTO 2013—
33rd annual cryptology conference, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 18–22, 2013,
proceedings, part I, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 8042, Springer, 2013. See
[27].
[9] Matthias Christandl, Renato Renner, Artur Ekert, A generic security proof for quan-
tum key distribution (2004). URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0402131.
Citations in this document: §1.
[10] Daniel Gottesman, Hoi-Kwong Lo, Norbert Lütkenhaus, John Preskill, Security of
quantum key distribution with imperfect devices, Quantum Information and Compu-
tation 4 (2004), 325–360. URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0212066. Ci-
tations in this document: §1.
[11] Brian Greene, The hidden reality: Parallel universes and the deep laws of the cosmos,
Penguin, 2011. ISBN 9781846145353. Citations in this document: §3.
[12] Mordechai Guri, Andrey Daidakulov, Yuval Elovici, MAGNETO: Covert channel
between air-gapped systems and nearby smartphones via CPU-generated magnetic
fields (2018). URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1802.02317. Citations in this docu-
ment: §3.
9
[13] Gerard ’t Hooft, Dimensional reduction in quantum gravity, in [2] (1993). URL:
https://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/9310026. Citations in this document: §3.
[14] Anqi Huang, Shihan Sajeed, Poompong Chaiwongkhot, Mathilde Soucarros,
Matthieu Legre, Vadim Makarov, Gaps between industrial and academic solutions to
implementation loopholes in QKD: testing random-detector-efficiency countermea-
sure in a commercial system (2016). URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1601.00993.
DOI: 10.1109/JQE.2016.2611443. Citations in this document: §2, §5.
[15] Richard J. Hughes, Douglas M. Alde, P. Dyer, Gabriel G. Luther, George
L. Morgan, Martin M. Schauer, Quantum cryptography, Contemporary Physics
36 (1995), 149–163. URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9504002. DOI:
10.1080/00107519508222149. Citations in this document: §1.
[16] ID Quantique, Understanding quantum cryptography, version 3.0 (2016). URL:
https://tinyurl.com/y9zok2c2. Citations in this document: §1.
[17] Lluís Masanes, Renato Renner, Matthias Christandl, Andreas Winter, Jonathan
Barrett, Full security of quantum key distribution from no-signaling constraints,
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 60 (2014), 4973–4986. URL: https://
arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0606049. DOI: 10.1109/TIT.2014.2329417. Citations in
this document: §2.
[18] Sergey N. Molotkov, Sergey S. Nazin, A simple proof of the unconditional secu-
rity of relativistic quantum cryptography, Journal of Experimental and Theoretical
Physics 92 (2001), 871–878. URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0008008.
DOI: 10.1134/1.1378181. Citations in this document: §2.
[19] Arthur Neslen, Paris climate activists put under house arrest using emergency
laws (2015). URL: http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/nov/27/
paris-climate-activists-put-under-house-arrest-using-emergency-laws.
Citations in this document: §6.
[20] Stefano Pironio, Antonio Acín, Nicolas Brunner, Nicolas Gisin, Serge
Massar, Valerio Scarani, Device-independent quantum key distribution se-
cure against collective attacks, New Journal of Physics 11 (2009), 045021
(25pp). URL: http://www.unige.ch/gap/quantum/_media/publications:bib:
qkddeviceindepfull.pdf. DOI: 10.1088/1367-2630/11/4/045021. Citations in this
document: §2.
[21] Rainer Plaga, A fundamental threat to quantum cryptography: gravitational attacks,
The European Physical Journal D—Atomic, Molecular, Optical and Plasma Physics
38 (2006), 409–413. URL: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1140/epjd/
e2006-00045-y. Citations in this document: §5.
[22] Terry Rudolph, The laws of physics and cryptographic security (2002). URL:
https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0202143. Citations in this document: §5.
[23] Valerio Scarani, Christian Kurtsiefer, The black paper of quantum cryptography: Real
implementation problems, Theoretical Computer Science 560 (2014), 27–32. URL:
https://arxiv.org/abs/0906.4547. Citations in this document: §5, §5.
[24] Christian Schaffner, Quantum cryptography: from key distribution to position-based
cryptography (talk slides) (2015). URL: https://events.ccc.de/congress/2015/
Fahrplan/events/7305.html. Citations in this document: §3.
10
[25] Peter W. Shor, John Preskill, Simple proof of security of the BB84 quantum key
distribution protocol, Physical Review Letters 85 (2000), 441–444. URL: https://
arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0003004. DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevLett.85.441. Citations
in this document: §1.
[26] Leonard Susskind, The world as a hologram, Journal of Mathematical Physics
36 (1995), 6377–6396. URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/9409089. DOI:
10.1063/1.531249. Citations in this document: §3.
[27] Dominique Unruh, Everlasting multi-party computation, in Crypto 2013 [8] (2013),
380–397. URL: https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/177. Citations in this document:
§3.
11
